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ABSTRACT
To support the successful integration of 
civilian and military domestic disaster 
medical response,  the Yale New  Haven 
Center for Emergency Preparedness and 
Disaster Response (YNH-CEPDR) and US 
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) have 
established the National Center for 
Integrated Civilian-Military Domestic 
Disaster Medical Response (ICMDDMR). As 
part of the ICMDDMR, YNH-CEPDR has 
conducted research to determine the 
requirements of a national operational 
epidemiological modeling process to 
integrate modelers  with operational decision 
makers  during an infectious  disease  event of 
national significance. This  article presents  a 
proposed process  that is  based on research 
and consultation with a workgroup of 
i n t e r a g e n c y a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 
stakeholders.
INTRODUCTION
The National  Health  Security  Strategy 
(NHSS) recognizes that  in  order to protect 
the nation  from  public health  threats, it  is 
critical for  responders, the private  sector  and 
federal,  state, and local  government  to work 
together. 1 
During a  public health  emergency, 
decision  makers often  require prospective 
epidemiological  information  that  can  be 
provided by  epidemiological  models.2 
Without a  coordinated process linking 
decision  makers with  modelers, leaders may 
become overwhelmed with  the amount  and 
complexity  of information received,  or  the 
proper  information  may  not  be provided in  a 
timely  manner. Additionally, it  is difficult  for 
the non-specialist  to rapidly  confirm  the 
va l id i ty  o f each model , potent ia l ly 
undermining  confidence in  the information 
from the models to make critical decisions. 
There is currently  no formalized process 
among US government agencies and 
d e p a r t m e n t s t o s u p p o r t e f f e c t i v e 
coordination  between modelers and decision 
makers.  Moreover, there is no way  for 
decision makers to request  operational 
epidemiological  models unless their 
respective organization has pre-existing 
capabilities and/or relationships to solicit 
operational  epidemiological models. 3  And 
yet,  the nature of a  complex biological  event 
requires decision makers to have access to 
the kind of information  that  can  be provided 
by  such  models.  Articulating  this point,  the 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) identifies the 
need to “improve information  management, 
i n c l u d i n g  s c e n a r i o m o d e l i n g  a n d 
forecasting.” 4 An  integrated national process 
for  operational  epidemiological modeling 
would support improved information 
management in a health emergency.
DETERMINING THE 




This study  sought to understand the nature 
and scope of existing  relationships between 
modelers and decision  makers prior to 
determining the requirements of a  national 
operational epidemiological  modeling 
process (NOEMP). The research  team 
conducted a literature review, which  included 
reviewing  government  publications and 
reports, peer-reviewed articles, and agency/
organizations’ policies and mandates. The 
literature review  focused on  describing the 
scope of the policy  landscape for the use of 
o p e r a t i o n a l  m o d e l s ,  r o l e s ,  a n d 
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responsibilities in  an infectious disease 
disaster  response. Associated mission 
statements,  organizational structures,  and 
operational  capabilities of various agencies 
were also captured. 
Concurrently,  stakeholders were engaged 
through an  interagency  workgroup that 
included members of the epidemiological 
modeling  community  as well as the health 
and medical consequence management 
communities. (Workgroup members served 
as subject matter  experts,  but  their 
participation  should not necessarily  be 
considered an  endorsement or  acceptance of 
findings.) Workgroup members were 
recruited through  existing relationships and 
included subject  matter  experts employed by 
federal  agencies (including the Departments 
of Agriculture, Defense, Health  and Human 
Services,  and Homeland Security), state and 
local public  health  agencies,  national 
laboratories, academia, and private sector 
“think-tank”  organizations.  The workgroup 
identified information  sources for  agency/
organizational  research  and reference, and 
provided reviews of preliminary  documents 
from this study. 
The research  indicated that a  national 
operational epidemiological  modeling 
process should be structured around three 
distinct priorities:
1. Develop an interagency  process that 
establishes and cultivates relationships 
b e t w e e n m o d e l  d e v e l o p e r s a n d 
operational  coordination structures for 
incorporation of models into response 
planning, execution, and evaluation;
2. Increase availability  of models and model 
outputs that support  operational decision 
making;
3. E n h a n c e a b i l i t y  o f o p e r a t i o n a l 
coordinators to integrate  models into 
their  information  analysis processes for 
decision support.
Once the study  team  completed the 
literature review,  the stakeholder  workgroup 
convened in  Arlington, VA, on  August 11, 
2011, to determine the requirements of a 
national operational epidemiological 
modeling  process. This meeting  identified the 
following components of a  successful 
National Operational Epidemiological 
Modeling Process (NOEMP):
1. Functions via  diverse interagency 
w o r k g r o u p r a t h e r  t h a n  s i n g l e 
organization;
2. Operates with  administrative and fiscal 
management provided by a lead agency;
3. Develops and aligns modeling  guidance 
and standards with  available funding 
streams;
4. Directs funds to models designed to 
support decision making ;
5. Channels funds to local  and state public 
health  departments and other similar 
users to mitigate shortfalls;
6. Leverages existing federal  modeling 
infrastructures; 
7. Accommodates the diverse missions of 
stakeholders;
8. Enhances the use of models during  an 
operational  response,  including  sharing 
models and model outputs within  and 
between agencies/organizations.
Several events were held with  stakeholders 
to gain direction and input as the NOEMP 
was being  refined. Near  the end of this phase 
of the research, the study  team  presented and 
discussed the draf t NOEMP to the 
stakeholder  workgroup on  November  10, 
2011,  via  a  web-based tool (WebEx™ 
Training Session  5.5).  The stakeholders 
provided substantive feedback leading  to 
additional revisions.  The study  team 
presented the revised process in  a scenario-
based, exercise environment to a small group 
during  the Public Health  Preparedness 
Summit in  Anaheim,  CA, on  February  21, 
2012  in a blended web-based and in-person 
format (also utilizing  WebEx™ Training 
Session  5.5).  Exercise players included 
workgroup members as well as external 
public health  stakeholders with  no previous 
knowledge of the NOEMP.  The NOEMP was 
revised further and is presented below.
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The NOEMP is defined as a  national 
“process”  that aggregates efforts of people, 
tasks,  and organizations operating  for the 
common purpose of effectively  integrating 
models with  prospective infectious disease 
response decision-making. The purpose of 
the NOEMP is to establish  and maintain  a 
national capability  to produce infectious 
disease modeling  outputs that are supportive 
of a  broad range of information requirements 
among  agency/organizational consequence 
management  Operational  Coordinators (OC). 
OC are defined in this study  as the staff 
responsible for  coordinating  the flow  of 
information  to and from  policy  decision 
makers and tactical  capabilities within  an 
agency  or  organization. They  are also 
responsible  for  identifying  external sources of 
information  and providing sufficient  analysis 
of the information  to allow  decision  makers 
at  policy  and agency/organizational  tactical 
levels to make well-informed decisions. The 
NOEMP will allow  the OC to integrate this 
prospective information  into their  decision 
support  process and give them  the ability  to 
include not  only  the information  provided by 
the NOEMP but also other  models developed 
and executed outside of the NOEMP.
The process recognizes the following  types 
of models as providing  information  that  is 
relevant  across a  broad spectrum  of decision 
types and decision makers:
• Impact  Models: Forecast the impact of 
an  infectious disease on such  activities as 
the ability  to continue essential services, 
maintain  Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Resources (CI/KR), and the economy.
• Intervention  Models: Predict  the 
impact  of intervention strategies on  a 
disease’s direction,  intensity,  and impact 
on  a population.  These models provide 
insight  into potential countermeasure 
policy  and operational questions (e.g., 
awareness,  preparation, prevention, 
response, and recovery  mitigation 
strategies).
• Spread Pattern  Models: Forecast the 
spread patterns of disease, utilizing 
relevant  demographic, social,  and 
geographic information  of the population, 
in a given time frame.  
• Intensity  Models: Forecast the severity 
of the disease burden  in  terms of 
morbidity  and mortality  within  a  given 
time frame.
To better  establish  regular  and sustainable 
progress in  disseminating  model information 
products,  a  phased approach  to incorporating 
the process should be considered. The first 
phase should be limited to models that 
forecast  the impacts of infectious disease 
outbreaks and of intervention  strategies at  a 
national level and, where data  is made 
available, at state and local levels. The second 
phase should expand to include spread and 
intensity  models. The models should not be 
exclusive to human  models, but should also 
include models on  diseases in  animal 
populations and vegetation  that potentially 
impact  human  health  (consistent with  the 
One Health  concept). 5  The process should 
aggregate  and disseminate model  outputs to 
a  broad spectrum  of operational  coordination 
structures within response agencies. The 
process should include a catalogue of relevant 
models in  order to maintain  awareness of 
national capabilit ies for  operational 
epidemiological modeling, as well as to 
faci l itate  potential  modeler  and OC 
relationships. 
Outlined below  is a  proposed inter-
agency/organizational structure with  tangible 
capabi l i t ies that  can be e f fec t ive ly 
coordinated and implemented during an 
emergency for the benefit of all stakeholders. 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
This study  recommends that  the NOEMP be 
governed by  the Interagency  Operational 
Modeling  Advisory  Group (IOMAG).  The 
IOMAG should be led by  and include 
representatives from  the federal  interagency, 
and have representation  from  state,  local, 
county,  and tribal  governments,  and private 
and academic  sectors (see Figure 1). This 
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advisory  body  should be integrated into an 
existing  strategic,  federal interagency 
biosurveillance governance structure under 
the rules and regulations established by  the 
Federal  Advisory  Committee Act  (FACA).  The 
role of this advisory  committee should be to 
provide guidance and recommendations to its 
affiliated inter-agency  governance structure 
on strategic topics to:
• Provide strategic direction  of the national 
operational  epidemiological modeling 
capability;
• Review  and approve guidance for 
operational  model development  for 
inclusion in the NOEMP;
• Review and approve NOEMP policy;
• Determine measures of effectiveness and 
regularity  of reporting (e.g.,  steady  state 
and response);
• Facilitate interagency coordination;
• Advise  on  operational epidemiological 
model funding  priorities, and research 
and development strategies;
• Ensure existing  epidemiological modeling 
c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e l e v e r a g e d a n d 
redundancies are avoided;
• Coordinate and advise on  operational 
priorities for  epidemiological  modeling 
during an event of national significance.
Figure 1 – NOEMP Proposed Structure
Existing Interagency Coordination Group
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The administration and management  of the 
NOEMP should be integrated into an  existing 
management  structure that can coordinate 
the human  resource and financial  needs of 
this process.  Additionally,  this management 
structure should be able to provide 
overarching quality  assurance and quality 
control  processes and will  have pre-existing 
relationships and complimentary  information 
products for  supporting a common  operating 
p i c t u r e a m o n g  t h e b i o s u r v e i l l a n c e 
community.  The creation  of a  program 
manager  position  for  Model Integration  and 
Dissemination  may  be required to ensure the 
functioning  of a Model Integration  and 
Dissemination  Unit  (see below)  into the 
existing management structure.
OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES
Operational activities should be carried out 
by  a  newly  created Model  Integration and 
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Dissemination  Unit  (MIDU) with  the existing 
management  structure under  the leadership 
of the Model  Integration  and Dissemination 
Program  Manager.  The MIDU should include 
analytical  staff that  is responsible for all 
operational  activities of coordinating  among 
stakeholders,  integrating  model outputs into 
the NOEMP, analyzing model parameters 
and outputs,  and developing/disseminating 
information  products to stakeholder  OC. The 
positions and general  responsibilities are 
outlined in Table 1.
Table 1 – MIDU Position Expertise and Duties
Health and Medical Operations 
Analyst Information Product Analyst Epi Modeling Technical Analyst
Expertise includes: Expertise includes: Expertise includes:
• Coordination of health and 
medical response 
operations
• Identification of information 
requirements and 
information sources for 
operational decision making
• Integration of model 
information with health and 
medical response operation
• Health and medical 
operational decision making 
processes
• Visual analytics
• Technical/graphical systems 
for communicating 
information
• Communications policy and 
guidance development
• Mathematical model 
development
• Epidemiology or infectious 
diseases data standards
• Data management and 
aggregation
• Technical policy and 
guideline development
• Oversight of model 
validation, verification and 
evaluation 
Duties include: Duties include: Duties include:
• Support model output 
analysis and summarization 
• Draft content for information 
products
• Maintain relationships with 
Operational Coordinators
• Draft policy/guidance to 
prioritize research and 
develop initiatives based on 
information requirements of 
Operational Coordinators
• Coordinate with Operational 
Coordinators to determine 
information requirements 
from model outputs
• Develop templates for 
dissemination of model 
outputs
• Develop/maintain list of 
Operational Coordinators to 
receive information products
• Disseminate model outputs 
as needed
• Draft model validation and 
verification requirements for 
IOMAG review/approval
• Develop model output 
technical requirements (in 
collaboration with all MIDU 
analysts)
• Run existing models, or 
solicit model outputs from 
external model developers 
as needed
• Determine/review model 
parameters based on 
surveillance information
• Coordinate the integration of 
models into the NOEMP
• Provide technical assistance 
to external partners 
developing models for the 
NOEMP
• Determine data input 
standards for the receipt 
and integration of data into 
NOEMP models
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The MIDU will  also require the capability 
to provide operational  epidemiological  model 
outputs for  information  products. Some 
models will need to be procured or  may  be 
submitted from  external  partners and may  be 
run  by  the MIDU modeling  technical  analyst
(s). The MIDU analyst(s) must have an 
understanding  of how  the models operate 
and their  associated limitations,  so the 
models can  be utilized to provide information 
during response operations. The models’ 
outputs should be in a format  that  allows for 
analysis by  the MIDU health  and medical 
operations analyst(s) and information 
product analyst(s).  External  partners may  be 
leveraged for  the model development, data 
input, and model running  processes as well; 
however, these external partners must  be 
able to provide appropriate model outputs as 
requested by  the NOEMP. In  order  for 
information  products to be provided to the 
OC, the model  outputs must  be analyzed by 
the MIDU’s health  and medical operations 
analyst and information  product analyst. 
After  analyzing  outputs the analysts will 
create information  products for  use by  the 
OC.
 The activities performed would be 
dist inguished between  two types of 
operations: steady-state  operations and 
response operations (see Figure 2). The 
steady-state operational period is considered 
to be the time period when  the MIDU is not 
activated by  a  federal agency.  The response 
operational  period is the time period when 
the MIDU has been  activated by  a  federal 
a g e n c y  t o p r o v i d e e p i d e m i o l o g i c a l 
information.    
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NOEMP Scope
Referral Process
for Requirements Outside of 
NOEMP Scope
Steady-State Operations
During  steady-state operations the NOEMP 
should work  with  stakeholders to determine 
how  information results will  be produced and 
presented to the requester  once the 
information  provided by  the model has been 
analyzed.  By  engaging stakeholders early  in 
the process, the NOEMP can  then leverage 
these established relationships to conduct 
exercises and provide modeling support 
during  small-scale incidents in  order  to refine 
the process that will be used during  response 
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operat ions of nat ional s ignif icance. 
Stakeholders will then  be able  to provide 
guidance and insight  into the validation and 
verification  processes they  currently  use and 
assist  in  determining the minimum 
acceptable  validation and verification 
standards for the NOEMP.  
The NOEMP should also have the ability 
to operate as a  referral service  for those 
agencies having  specific  model requests that 
could not  be fulfilled by  the organization. 
This ability  will be gained through  the 
relationships established with  model 
development organizations. During  the 
steady  state period the organization may 
provide support  to communities to provide 
targeted infectious disease outbreak support. 
Dur ing the in i t ia l phases o f the 
implementation  of the NOEMP, research 
priorities will need to be established based on 
identified epidemiological  modeling  gaps and 
the MIDU should work to close those gaps by 
developing  in-house models.  As stated 
earlier,  standards will be identified for  the 
type and amount of data  gathered for  the 
model process, model run-time, and the 
levels of analysis to be conducted on  the 
model outputs. Decision  makers and OC will 
have such  a  variety  of information  that  it  may 
not be possible for the NOEMP to close all 
identified gaps, therefore, some models may 
be submitted for  use to the MIDU but  will 
n e e d t o b e e x e c u t e d b y  e x t e r n a l 
organizations.  Policies and procedures will 
need to be created for  the submission  of 
models by  external agencies. Examples of 
these policies and procedures may  be the 
amount  of time it  takes for  a  model to create 
outputs, on-going  model maintenance,  and 
type of information  being  analyzed.  As 
discussed above,  validation  and verification 
standards will  also need to be developed/
adopted for  both  model outputs from  internal 
and external  models.  The stakeholders will 
need to be involved in  this process in  order  to 
ensure that  information  products are 
accepted by their agencies.
Response Operations
The MIDU will  need to establish  response 
triggers, which  will pre-determine how 
involved the MIDU will become with  an 
infectious disease outbreak. The established 
triggers may  be based on  population size, 
proximity  to borders, or  the MIDU may 
provide information based on  direct  orders 
from  federal officials.  These triggers for 
transition to response operations should be 
distinct  from  decision  making  for  outbreak 
support  and exercise participation during 
steady-state operations.  (It  is also understood 
that  other  variables beyond triggers will  also 
influence level of effort by MIDU).
When  the NOEMP is “triggered”  or 
otherwise called upon during  a  response, 
MIDU staff members should be redirected 
from  steady-state operations to focus on 
processing  all  collected information  and 
c r e a t i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  p r o d u c t s f o r 
dissemination.  The information  should be 
gathered by  running models within  the 
organizations or  by  reaching  out to modeling 
organizations and requesting  specific model 
outputs. This data  will  be integrated into 
information  products that will be provided to 
e x t e r n a l  O C . I n f o r m a t i o n  p r o d u c t 
d e v e l o p m e n t w i l l  b e b a s e d o n  t h e 
collaboration  with OC during  the steady-state 
operational period.  The NOEMP should 
maintain  its role as a  referral agency  if 
information  requests were made that could 
not be fulfilled with  cataloged models or  if 
the organization was unable to develop the 
appropriate model  within the operational 
time period. The stakeholder  relationships 
establ ished during  the s teady-state 
operational  period will be critical during  the 
response period.  Those that  have interacted 
with  the organization prior  to a  response 
situation  will  be educated on  the processes 
and will  be familiar  with  the information 
products produced by the MIDU. 
The timeframe for  making decisions is 
variable,  so is the time required for running 
models. It  is recommended that  the NOEMP 
provide information  products on  a  daily 
schedule initially.  This will  narrow  the scope 
of models that can  be run  to those that  can 
produce usable outputs in  less than twenty-
four  hours,  and will  target decisions that  can 
be informed by  daily  updates of information. 
As the NOEMP is developed further  and the 
understanding  of health  and medical decision 
making and the field of operational 
epidemiological modeling  matures, the 
frequency  and types of reporting may  be 
expanded with  a long  term  goal  of being  able 
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to accommodate four  to six  hour  decision 
cycles for events of national significance. 
Data Collection/Management
The output  of the models for  information 
dissemination will only  be as good as the 
surveillance data  that  is provided to run  the 
models. Additionally,  the timely  collection  of 
data  will  be required in  order to rapidly 
receive and aggregate model  outputs. In 
order  to accomplish  this it  will be necessary 
for  the NOEMP to be co-located with  a 
national biosurveillance center  or  to have a 
close relationship with  those who have pre-
existing  relationships with  sources of 
biosurveillance data. 
Additionally,  the NOEMP may  need to be 
able to work with de-personalized data  from 
state and local sources and to ensure the 
privacy  and integration  of the data  from 
those OC who are providing  it. This may 
require the use of partially  aggregated data 
from  the local and state surveillance systems. 
Automation  of data sharing should also be 
recognized as an  important factor  in 
receiving  data  from  surveillance systems that 
may  not  have staffing to devote to providing 
data during response activities.
In  order  to collect data, the OC providing 
it  should also have the opportunity  to realize 
jurisdictional  value for  their  efforts. 
Therefore,  it  is proposed that they  provide 
epidemiological  information to the MIDU 
through  an  established process on a  set 
schedule during  the steady-state operational 
period. By  providing  information  to the 
MIDU, during  a  response OC may  receive 
data  run  specifically  for  their  information as 
well  as the aggregate national  data.  The 
agencies participating  during  steady-state 
operations may  also be given  a  priority  status 
for  information dissemination during  a 
response operation. 




The NOEMP,  as proposed, is intended as the 
beginning  of a  process that will  grow  and 
mature over time.  Specific  decision-making 
questions of a  jurisdiction  and/or  agency  may 
not necessarily  be accommodated through  a 
broad reaching  national process nor  will  a 
national process be able to accommodate 
every  response at  the  federal, state and local 
level. Model information  will be variable 
based on  the models that are run  and the 
data  that  is available.  This variability  should 
be embraced as a  reality  of forecasting  the 
spread of disease within  a  social environment 
and be integrated into model output 
information products.  Additionally,  the 
science of health  and medical operational 
decision-making is an  emerging area  of 
research  and will  need to continue to grow  to 
p r o v i d e t h e N O E M P w i t h  c r i t i c a l 
understanding of the desired impact  of 
information  products and model outputs. 
Epidemiological  modeling is a  well-
established scientific  practice; however, the 
application  to operational decision making is 
not  as widespread and will require a 
coordinated effort  among the scientific  and 
academic  communities to ensure a  supply  of 
appropriate models for  the NOEMP. As the 
fields of health  and medical operational 
modeling  and decision making  grow, the 
NOEMP will grow  in tandem, providing  a 
critical linkage between  scientific  analysis 
and operational decision  making.  Finally, 
there are limited opportunities to test 
models, particularly  for  rare catastrophic 
events and incidents of bioterrorism.  The 
parameter  sets for  infectious disease models 
will be inherently  limited, as they  will be 
based on historic data  and subject matter 
expert  conjecture. While efforts can  be made 
to keep parameter  information  near  real-time 
through  advanced surveillance data,  this will 
always be an  assumption  imbedded into 
models.
CONCLUSIONS
A  NOEMP should be structured in  a  way  that 
e ng ag e s t h e int e rag e nc y  and o t h e r 
stakeholders in  a manner that  is conducive to 
collaboration  among varying sets of 
capabilities and information  requirements. 
The core function  of the NOEMP should be to 
ensure that OC are able to obtain  information 
products with modeling information  within  a 
timeframe that  can  support  operational 
decision  making.  Additionally, the NOEMP 
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should also have awareness of the modeling 
community  and consequence community  in 
order  to foster relationships and refer 
potential partners to one another  for  long-
term  collaboration.  The creation  of the MIDU 
will provide an  operational vehicle  that  can 
support  these functions as a  dedicated 
resource.
The implementation  and operation  of the 
NOEMP should seek  to leverage existing 
funding and operational structures to ensure 
the prudent  use of fiscal resources as well as 
to integrate effectively  within  the interagency 
and other  stakeholders. The implementation 
process should be tiered over  several years 
and have clear capabilities that provide early 
and sustainable value to response operations. 
The successful establishment  of the 
NOEMP will require ongoing  collaboration 
and participation  of stakeholder  agencies and 
organizations.
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